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Abstract
Background: Anxiety is characterized by a bias towards threatening information, anxious apprehension, and disrupted
concentration. Previous research in healthy subjects suggests that working memory (WM) is disrupted by induced
anxiety, but that increased task-demand reduces anxiety and WM is preserved. However, it is unknown if patients with
generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) can similarly normalize their performance on difficult WM tasks while reducing their
anxiety. Increased threat-related bias and impoverished top-down control in trait anxiety suggests that patients may
not reap the same cognitive and emotional benefits from demanding tasks that those low in anxiety. Here we examine
this possibility using a WM task of varying difficulty.
Methods: GAD patients (N = 30) and healthy controls (N = 30) performed an n-back task (no-load, 1-back, 2-back, and
3-back) while at risk for shock (threat) or safe from shock (safe). Anxiety was measured via startle reflex and self-report.
Results: As predicted, healthy controls’ performance was impaired under threat during low-load tasks and facilitated
during high-load tasks. In contrast, GAD patients’ performance was impaired under threat regardless of WM load.
Anxiety was reduced as cognitive load increased in both groups.
Conclusions: The divergence of emotion regulation (reduction) and performance (persistent impairment) in the
patient but not the control group, suggests that different top-down mechanisms may be operating to reduce
anxiety. Continued WM disruption in patients indicates that attentional resources are allocated to emotion regulation
instead of goal-directed behavior. Implications for our understanding of cognitive disruption in patients, and related
therapeutic interventions are discussed.
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Background
A growing body of research examining the impact of
anxiety on working memory (WM) suggests that while
adaptive anxiety (i.e., anxiety in healthy individuals) can
disrupt WM [1–4], an increase in task demands may
successfully direct attention away from anxiety [1, 2]. Al-
though this latter effect has positive implications for
overcoming anxiety, a key element to consider is that
these studies were only conducted in healthy individuals.
While models of anxiety have been relatively effective in
elucidating anxiety-related changes in cognition [5], they
are by no means perfect replicas of anxious pathology.
Pathological anxiety is characterized by attentional bias
towards threat [6]), and anxiety can alter perception very
early in the processing stream [7], perhaps at the ex-
pense of other goal-directed information. Patients with
generalized anxiety disorder (GAD), in particular, dem-
onstrate a predominance of verbally-mediated worry [8],
consuming critical cognitive resources. We propose that
difficulty in disengaging from threat results in a funda-
mental hijacking of the attentional system that would
normally shift to support WM processes. Moreover, this
effect should be specifically evident in verbal WM tasks
that may share resources with verbally-mediated worry.
As a result, verbal WM performance may be disrupted
in GAD patients even if a task is very engaging.* Correspondence: katye.vytal@mail.nih.gov
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Pathological anxiety and working memory: a gap in the
literature
While it is clear that anxiety is associated with an atten-
tional bias towards threats, there is little research actu-
ally demonstrating that active1 anxious pathology
disrupts cognition. The majority of WM research in pa-
tients has been conducted in the absence of an anxio-
genic stressor [9, 10] and the effects are equivocal. This
lack of consistent findings contrasts with the clinical ob-
servation of a greater susceptibility to distraction in anx-
ious patients and may be the result of the fact that
cognitive impairments are studied in safe laboratory en-
vironments. To our knowledge, no study has examined
anxious patients’ WM during an anxiogenic challenge.
In support of the link between anxiety and WM im-
pairment, other work has shown that trait anxiety, a
marker of vulnerability to pathology, is associated with
cognitive disruption [11–15]. For example, trait anxiety
is associated with executive function impairment when a
visuospatial WM task and a finger taping task is per-
formed concurrently, but not when it is performed alone
[11]. Other work has shown that individuals with dispo-
sitional worry [14] and dispositional anxiety [15] experi-
ence WM disruption when confronted with threatening
distractors. These findings suggest that anxiety-related
WM impairment may not be evident without placing
additional demand on the cognitive system (either with
a dual-task or emotion induction). Additional research
in GAD patients, who tend to exhibit both dispositional
anxiety and dispositional worry, is needed to characterize
the relationship between pathological anxiety and verbal
working memory.
Top-down control mechanisms in adaptive versus
pathological anxiety
While examining the impact of anxiety on cognitive dis-
ruption is critical, it is equally important to investigate
anxiety reduction mechanisms. Previous research sug-
gests that engaging tasks may effectively reduce shock-
induced anxiety in healthy participants [1] to a similar
extent as active emotion regulation strategies like re-
appraisal [16] or detachment [17, 18]. The basic
principle across these strategies is the same: top down
executive control mechanisms refocus attention and in-
directly (or directly) down regulate anxiety. In contrast,
a separate line of research suggests that trait anxiety
may actually become more disruptive when cognitive
tasks are challenging [19, 20]. This discrepancy illus-
trates the difference between state and trait anxiety. The
attentional control theory proposes that cognitive
disruption occurs because anxiety activates a stimulus-
driven network (bottom-up) at the expense of a goal-
driven network (top-down control) [21]. Thus, active
adaptive anxiety may engage a stimulus-driven system
when task demands are low, leaving cognitive processes
susceptible to disruption, while more demanding tasks
preferentially engage a goal-driven system leading to
successful performance in the face of threat. On the
other hand, active pathological anxiety and active trait
anxiety may intractably activate the stimulus-driven sys-
tem, with impoverished top-down control [22, 23] lead-
ing to cognitive disruption regardless of task difficulty.
The current study
Here we explored the impact of anxious pathology on
working memory when subjects are in a threatening en-
vironment (anticipating a shock), and conversely, the im-
pact of task difficulty on performance in the face of
threat. GAD patients and healthy control participants
performed a verbal n-back task of varying difficulty
(view [no response], 1-back, 2-back, and 3-back) while
at risk for shock and while safe from shock. The startle
reflex served as a probe of anxiety [24]. We expected to
replicate findings in healthy individuals by using an
identical paradigm [1, 2], showing that induced-anxiety
disrupts n-back WM under lower-load tasks and per-
formance is normalized under threat on higher-load
tasks. We predicted that patients with GAD would be
impaired regardless of task difficulty, with active anxiety
disrupting executive control mechanisms that direct at-
tention towards a task. The possibility of persistent WM
disruption under high cognitive load in anxiety patients
would pinpoint a critical link between pathological
anxiety and perseverative cognitive impairment, which




Sixty-two subjects received monetary compensation for
participation in the study. Upon arrival at the National
Institutes of Health, participants completed an intake evalu-
ation consisting of a physical exam, urine screen, and a
Structured Clinical Interview for assessing DSM-IV Axis I
psychiatric diagnoses [25]. Exclusion was based on the fol-
lowing criteria: 1) acute or chronic medical condition (other
than psychopathology), 2) past or current personal or fam-
ily history of psychiatric disorder(s) (healthy only), 3) past
or current cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) treatment, 4)
use of psychoactive medications in past month, or illicit
drugs (e.g., marijuana, cocaine etc.) usage, 5) lifetime history
of alcohol or drug dependence, 6) current pregnancy or
breast-feeding. Participants who met criteria for GAD as a
primary diagnosis without comorbid depression were in-
cluded in the study. The most common secondary diagno-
sis of GAD patients (N = 8) was social anxiety disorder.
Two participants were excluded because of incomplete
data. The final group of participants consisted of 30 healthy
Vytal et al. BMC Psychiatry  (2016) 16:62 Page 2 of 9
subjects (15 male; mean age 27 years) and 30 patients with
a primary diagnosis of GAD (13 male; mean age 31 years)
(see Table 1 for a breakdown of group demographics). A
sample of 30 participants in each group was selected based
on previous WM research that has had sufficient power to
detect effects using a similar paradigm [1, 2], as well as cog-
nitive research that has identified between-group effects
using GAD patient samples [26, 27]. Wechsler Abbreviated
Scale of Intelligence (WASI; [28]) scores did not differ be-
tween groups. The study design and consent documents
were approved by the Combined Neuroscience Institutional
Review Board of the National Institutes of Health. After the
procedures were fully explained, all subjects provided writ-
ten informed consent.
Paradigm
The paradigm used was identical to that of [1]. Briefly,
subjects engaged in a verbal n-back task of varying diffi-
culty (view, 1-back, 2-back, and 3-back) during period of
threat (risk for shock to the wrist; 0-2 shocks were deliv-
ered in each block) and safety (no shock) (see Fig. 1 for
a sample block). All subjects had experience with the
shock prior to the experiment during a shock work-up
procedure. Based on this work-up, the shock was indi-
vidually set at a level that was uncomfortable, but not
painful for each participant. Before each 50-s task block,
an instruction screen indicated the task to be performed.
Blocks alternated between threat and safe, and were sep-
arated by an 8 s ITI. Participants responded to each let-
ter based on whether the letter was the same or different
than one, two, or three trials back (n-back load order
was randomized). In the view condition, subjects simply
attended to the stimuli without making a button press.
Startle was probed with a short blast of white noise
every 18-22 s, in both threat and safe conditions. Follow-
ing each block of stimuli, subjects made a retrospective
anxiety rating that assessed their subjective anxiety dur-
ing the previous block on a scale from 1 (little to no
anxiety) to 9 (high or extreme anxiety).
Equipment
Presentation software (neurobehavioral systems) was
used to present visual stimuli on the computer screen
and control the presentation of shocks and startle
probes. Contact Precision Instruments equipment was
used to present shock stimuli and record facial EMG
responses. A Digitimer constant current stimulator
(DS7A; Digitimer, UK) was used to present shocks.
Shocks were administered using two 6 mm Ag/AgCl
electrodes that were attached to the median nerve of the
left wrist.
Data reduction and analysis
EMG data were sampled at 1000 Hz, filtered (30-500Hz),
rectified, and smoothed with a 20-ms time constant.
Startle responses were defined as the peak magnitude of
the eye blink reflex (20–100 ms after stimulus onset) rela-
tive to a 50-ms average baseline that immediately pre-
ceded the probe onset. Baseline artifacts resulted in the
exclusion of less than one percent of trials. Peak eye blink
magnitudes were T-scored (across all conditions) and av-
eraged within each condition for each subject to attenuate
large inter-individual differences in raw reflex magnitude.
To confirm that T-score transformation did not introduce
any artifact that might alter our effects, we conducted all
startle analyses with both the raw startle data and the
transformed data. The effects did not differ between data-
sets, and therefore we only report the findings based on T-
scored data. Psychometric equivalency for this paradigm
was determined in previous studies [1, 2], demonstrating
that any potential anxiety-related performance differences
in low load versus high load tasks cannot be attributed to
greater discriminating power (see [3] for a detailed discus-
sion of the importance of psychometric analysis in the
absence of a double dissociation). To confirm that per-
formance accuracy did not differ as a result of shock or
probe administration, trials that preceded or followed
shocks, and those that preceded or followed probes were
analyzed separately. No differences were found and all
Table 1 Sample demographics
Group N (M/F) Age WASI
M SD t M SD t
GAD patients 30 (13/17) 31 9.5 1.7 119.5 12.3 0.2
Healthy controls 30 (15/15) 27 7.3 119.0 10.4
M= number of males, F = number of females. All t-scores NS
Fig. 1 Sample Block. Paradigm consisted of alternating period of
threat and safe, indicated by colored borders with the same
respective labels. Each task block began with an instruction
screen (view, 1-back, 2-back, or 3-back), followed by a fixation
cross. Letters were presented for .5 s, and separated by a 2 s ITI.
Participants responded to each letter based on whether the letter was
the same as the letter one, two, or three trials back, depending on
the task
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trials were included in the final analysis. To address the
possibility of speed-accuracy tradeoffs, we analyzed RT
data using repeated-measures ANOVAs both within
(Anxiety x Load) and between subject groups (Group x
Anxiety x Load). Omissions were uncommon and un-
systematic in the n-back task; however, we excluded tri-
als where participants failed to respond before the next
stimulus appeared on the screen (i.e., 2500 ms post-
stimulus onset). All participants performed above chance.
Anxiety ratings and startle potentiation were examined
using 2 (Group: patient, control) x 2 (Anxiety: threat,
safe) x 4 (Load: view, 1-back, 2-back, 3-back) repeated-
measures ANOVAs. Performance differences in accur-
acy were examined using a 2 (Group: patient, control) x
2 (Anxiety: threat, safe) x 3 (Load: view, 1-back, 2-back,
3-back) repeated-measures ANOVA. Greenhouse-
Geisser corrections (GG-ε) were used for repeated-
measures ANOVAs that involved factors with three or
more levels. In addition to this guard against sphericity
violations, assumptions of normality for paired sample
t-tests (Shapiro-Wilk’s W test) and equality of variances
for repeated-measures ANOVAs (Levene’s Test for
Equality of Variances) were assessed and met. Alpha
was set at 0.05 for all statistical tests. All data were




The main effect of Anxiety (F(1,59) = 127.8, p < .001),
demonstrated that subjects reported experiencing more
anxiety when they were at risk for shock than when they
were safe (GAD patients: threat M = 4.5, safe M = 2.5,
t(29) = 8.6, p < .001; controls: threat M = 3.5, safe M = 1.7,
t(29) = 7.5, p < .001). Anxiety ratings were reduced during
threat versus safe conditions as WM load increased (Anx-
iety x Load interaction) (F(1,59) = 127.8, p < .001, η2 = .69),
but there was no Group x Anxiety x Load interaction
(F(1,59) = .4, p = .521, η2 = .01), indicating patients and
controls were similarly anxious in the threat versus safe
condition as WM load increased (see Fig. 2b for anxiety
ratings across load). Furthermore, patients were not sig-
nificantly more anxious than controls in the threat versus
safe condition (t(58) = .65, p = .521, GAD threat-safe rating
difference M = 2.0, SD = 1.3; control threat-safe rating dif-
ference: M = 1.8, SD = 1.3).
In addition to self-report, we used startle magnitude
to verify that threat of shock successfully induced anx-
iety. Startle magnitude did not differ between patients
and controls during threat versus safety across WM
load (Group x Anxiety x Load repeated-measures
ANOVA: F(3,174) = .7, p = .524, η2 = .16) (see Table 2
for Ms and SDs, and Fig. 2a for anxiety-potentiated
startle across load). Similarly, startle magnitude did
not differ between patients and controls during threat
versus safety (Group x Anxiety repeated measures
ANOVA: F(1,58) = .09, p = .772, η2 = .00). Nevertheless,
as predicted, the main effect of Anxiety demonstrated
that startle was consistently potentiated by threat of
shock, F(1,59) = 80.2, p < .0001, η2 = 1.00, confirming
the manipulation. Moreover, anxiety-potentiated startle
(threat – safe) was reduced by load (F(3,177) = 13.4,
p < .001, η2 = 1.0), indicating that load decreased anxiety
(confirmed by a linear trend: F(1,59) = 10.5, p < .005,
η2 = .89). Paired-sample t-tests showed that view
anxiety-potentiated startle was significantly higher
Fig. 2 Anxiety-potentiated startle and differential anxiety ratings across load. a GAD patient and healthy control anxiety-potentiated startle (APS;
threat-safe) was consistently elevated, suggesting anxiety was higher in threat versus safe conditions. APS was reduced as task difficulty increased,
indicating that anxiety was regulated with an increase in load. Paired sample t-tests demonstrated that patients’ APS during 3-back was significantly lower
than other conditions. Healthy controls’ APS during view was significantly higher than all other conditions, and APS during 3-back was also lower than
2-back. b Anxiety ratings for both groups were lower when subjects were engaged in the working memory task versus when they were simply viewing
the stimuli. Paired-sample t-tests indicate that ratings during view were significantly higher than all other levels of load. Asterisk indicates p< .05
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than all other levels of load (1-back: t(58) = 2.4, p < .05;
2-back: t(58) = 2.7, p < .05; 3-back t(58) = 5.0, p < .001),
and 3-back anxiety potentiated startle was significantly
lower than all levels of load (1-back: t(58) = 4.1, p < .001;
2-back: t(58) = 3.5, p < .005).
Performance
Consistent with our predictions, the three-way inter-
action between Group (patient, control), Anxiety
(threat, safe), and Load (1-back, 2-back, 3-back), was
significant (repeated measures ANOVA, F(2,118) = 58,
p = .001, η2 = .21), indicating that GAD patients and
healthy controls exhibited a different profile of anxiety-
related WM impairment in accuracy across load (see
Fig. 3 for patient and control performance). The inter-
action between Group and Anxiety at 3-back was sig-
nificant (F(1,58) = 19.2, η2 = .25), demonstrating that
induced anxiety has a different effect on GAD patient
3-back performance versus healthy control 3-back
performance. To further decompose this interaction,
performance data were analyzed separately for patients
and healthy controls .
The Anxiety and Load interaction for WM perform-
ance in GAD patients was not significant, F(2,60) = .3,
p = .770, η2 = .01. However, there was a significant main
effect of Anxiety on performance, F(1,30) = 27.3, p < .001,
η2 = .476, indicating that WM performance was impaired
overall during threat as compared to safe, regardless of
task difficulty (see Fig. 2). This finding indicates that under
both low and high cognitive load, an anxiogenic con-
text impaired WM in patients (threat – safe 1-back,
t(29) = -4.0, p < .01; 2-back, t(29) = -2.4, p < .05; and 3-back,
t(29) = -3.3, p < .005).
In contrast to patients, healthy controls showed a sig-
nificant interaction of Anxiety and Load, F(2,58) = 18.7,
p < .001, η2 = .39, reflecting the finding that 1-back and
2-back performance accuracy was impaired during
threat as compared to safe (t(29) = -4.1, p < .001, and
t(29) = -4.7, p < .001, respectively), but 3-back perform-
ance was facilitated by threat (t(29) = 2.9, p = .006) (see
Fig. 3). These findings suggest that in healthy controls,
lower-demand tasks are susceptible to disruption by
induced-anxiety, whereas higher-demand tasks are
facilitated by an adaptive anxiety. A comparison of
patient and healthy control accuracy during the safe
condition suggests a trend toward performance differ-
ences, but did not reveal a significant effect F(1,57) = 3.0,
p = .06). Further investigation of performance during the
safe condition, confirmed similar performance between
groups (t(58) = .706, p = .483), suggesting that performance
in the absence of an anxiogenic challenge was not driving
force of these group effects.
Omnibus tests were conducted for the main effects of
Group and Load on performance. The main effect of
Group was not significant, suggesting no overall per-
formance differences between groups when all factors
were collapsed (F(1,58) = .84, p = .364). As expected, the
main effect of Load was significant, indicating that WM
difficulty affected performance (F(2,58) = 18.7, p < .001,
η2 = .39). T-tests confirmed that performance signifi-
cantly decreased from 1-back to 2-back, and 2-back to
3-back (t(59) = 4.5, p < .001; 2-back, t(59) = 12.3, p < .001,
respectively). Thus, performance decreased as task diffi-
culty increased.
Reaction time
For both the patient and control groups, we confirmed
that RT did not differ between threat and safe across
Load, (patient: F(2,56) = 1.4, p = .249; control: F(2,56) = .0,
p = .981). More specifically, RT differences (threat-safe)
were not significantly different for any of the tasks (pa-
tients: controls: threat – safe 1-back, t(29) = -1.2, p = .245;
and 2-back, t(29) = -.0, p = .964, controls: threat – safe 1-
back, t(29) = .3, p = .734; 2-back, t(29) = .3, p = .800; and 3-
back, t(29) = .2, p = .858), except for 3-back in the patient
group, t(29) = 2.4, p = .021. However, this significant effect
was in the same direction as the performance data
(i.e., performance accuracy was lower and RT was
higher during 3-back threat), indicating that there was
not a speed-accuracy tradeoff.
To address the possibility of speed accuracy tra-
deoffs between subject groups, we conducted a re-
peated measures ANOVA on the reaction time
(RT) data between groups, which demonstrated no
significant interaction among Group, Condition,
and Load, F(2, 116) = 1.5, p = .231, between Group
and Condition (F(2, 58) = 1.7, p = .205), and be-
tween Group and Load (F(2, 116) = .4, p = .640).
These findings indicate that the differential
Table 2 Startle T-scores across subject groups
Threat Safe
Group View 1-Back 2-Back 3-Back View 1-Back 2-Back 3-Back
Startle potentiation
GAD patients 55.9(7.1) 52.1(6.1) 51.3(5.5) 50.3(5.9) 47.2(10.8) 45.2(4.9) 46.0(5.7) 48.0(5.0)
Healthy controls 56.2(5.3) 51.7(3.5) 52.5(3.4) 51.3(4.2) 48.0(4.5) 46.6(3.1) 47.4(2.8) 48.1(3.0)
All startle values are listed in T-score units. Standard deviations listed in parentheses
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Fig. 3 Threat and safe performance across load in patients and healthy controls. GAD patient and healthy control performance was
impaired in 1-back and 2-back tasks during threat versus safe conditions. However, in 3-back, patient performance was still impaired
while control performance was facilitated during threat. Asterisk indicates p < .05
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performance of patients and healthy controls was
not driven by differences in response time (i.e.,
speed-accuracy tradeoffs).
Discussion
Despite the fact that anxious patients complain of being
highly distractible by their anxiety, the present report
found no impairment in performance in the safe condi-
tion. This is consistent with many reports reporting nor-
mal performance on a range of cognitive tasks in anxiety
disorders [9, 29, 30]. However, our results showed per-
formance impairment in the GAD group during an
anxiogenic challenge. Specifically, the GAD patients ex-
hibited continued disruption of WM regardless of task
difficulty during threat of shock. Although the healthy
controls showed impaired performance during threat
under low WM load and facilitated performance during
threat under high WM load, anxious patients did not ex-
hibit cognitive benefits from engaging in more difficult
tasks when anticipating shocks. In contrast, overall levels
of anxiety did not differ between patients and controls,
as indicated by startle and behavioral ratings. These find-
ings indicate that anxiety regulation (indirect or direct)
related to task demand is effective in both groups.
However, the performance difference at 3-back indi-
cates that GAD patients’ focus on threat was not ame-
liorated by cognitive load. Together, these findings
suggest that top-down control of anxiety may occur
through qualitatively or quantitatively different mecha-
nisms in healthy controls and anxiety patients. Here,
we suggest that explicit top-down control of anxiety,
rather than anxiety itself, interferes with GAD WM
performance under high WM load.
Top-down control of anxiety: a different mechanism in
anxious pathology?
On the surface it would appear that WM load reduces
perceived anxiety and defensive responding in similar
ways for both GAD patients and healthy controls: startle
magnitude and anxiety ratings in threat versus safe are
reduced as load increases. Yet our WM data suggest that
the effects of anxiety are still present in GAD patients. If
WM performance is an indicator of anxious disruption,
as our findings suggest, then while perceived anxiety and
defensive responding decreases, the deleterious effects of
anxious pathology persist under difficult tasks. Why
might this occur? First, the disruption might result from
impoverished prefrontal control mechanisms in patho-
logical anxiety. Previous research suggests that trait anx-
iety, a potential marker for pathology, is associated with
poor top-down cognitive control [22, 31]. However, our
patient group showed intact regulation of anxiety as
measured by self-report and startle, with the rate of re-
duction statistically identical to our control group.
Impoverished control may result in disrupted cognition
but it should also be associated with preserved anxiety,
not effective reduction of anxiety. Further, in trait anx-
iety, this effect was observed only under easy tasks,
where behavioral disruption was detected (slower reac-
tion times) [22], indicating that this mechanism of dis-
ruption may be specific to low-load tasks.
We suggest that rather than impoverished attentional
control, our findings indicate that deliberate reduction
of anxiety in anxious patients may result from the acti-
vation of a different mechanism than that used by con-
trols. Specifically, we propose that the control group
experienced incidental anxiety reduction via redirection
of attention to focus on a task. Studies of attentional sys-
tems suggest that healthy individuals engage two separ-
ate networks in the brain depending on whether the
information being processed is task-related or stimulus-
related [32]. These two competing networks appear to
be somewhat mutually exclusive because when a goal or
stimulus initiates activity in one network, the other be-
comes disengaged. Thus, rather than engaging explicit
emotion regulation mechanisms, the control group may
have simply switched attentional systems from shock to
task as the task became more demanding and additional
value was placed on performance. Furthermore, the
additive effects of task stress and anxiogenic context re-
sulted not only in improved performance, but in better
performance during threat versus safety. Although not
initially predicted, these results are in line with research
that links acute stress with cognitive enhancements [33],
and in particular WM improvements [34].
The divergence between performance and startle data
may lend additional support to the claim that GAD pa-
tients are engaging a different cognitive mechanism than
controls. A significant interaction among Group, Anx-
iety, and Load indicates that the profile of anxiety-
related performance deficits differed across groups as
task difficulty increased. However, this same interaction
was not present in the startle data. Specifically, while
both groups demonstrated a reduction in anxiety-
potentiated startle as WM load increased, GAD patients
showed impaired performance across load, and healthy
controls showed impaired performance under low load
and improved performance under high load. In contrast
to the control group, which appears to regulate anxiety
by focusing on the task, we find that the patients regu-
lated their anxiety (evidenced by a reduction in anxiety-
potentiated startle) without improving their performance
in the high load condition. During low load, the per-
formance of all participants is disrupted by anxiety in-
duction because threat of shock is more salient than the
task (i.e., when task-related cognitive load is low). How-
ever, when the task is more engaging, we propose that
healthy controls switch from a threat-driven to a task-
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driven attentional system (reducing their anxiety and in-
creasing their performance) while GAD patients con-
tinue to explicitly focus on threat and threat-reduction
(reducing their anxiety and reducing their performance).
This dissociation suggests that GAD patients may have
preferentially focused on emotion down-regulation as
opposed to task performance.
Ochsner and Gross [35] propose a continuum of
cognitive control of emotion on which task-related dis-
traction and appraisal/reappraisal lie on opposite ends.
Task-related distraction depends on a shift in attention
from a negative emotion to a task, whereas reappraisal of
a negative stimulus depends on a shift in cognition (but
attention remains on the emotional stimulus). Given that
GAD patients are chronically anxious, it is not surprising
that these patients may have been preferentially motivated
to calm their anxiety versus perform a task. We suggest
that GAD patients intentionally engaged top-down regula-
tion mechanisms (e.g., reappraisal) to control their mount-
ing anxiety, thus resulting in the allocation of executive
resources toward emotion regulation at the expense of
goal-directed behavior.
This proposed qualitative disparity in anxiety reduc-
tion mechanisms between patients and controls may
hinge on the conscious activation of top-down regula-
tion mechanisms (patients) versus attentional redirection
(healthy controls). Indeed, when trait anxious subjects
are presented with subliminal (masked) distractors, there
is no effect on cognition, but supraliminal distractors
readily disrupt cognition in trait anxious subjects [31].
These findings suggest that conscious top-down control
may be particularly subject to interference in anxious
pathology. This hypothesis should be explicitly explored
by using the current study’s paradigm in the context of a
neuroimaging experiment to identify neural mechanisms
of regulation and disruption in pathological anxiety. By
comparing the connectivity of brain regions during
threat versus safe across load, we can test the claim of
whether or not patients and controls engage in different
regulatory mechanisms.
Strengths and limitations
Among the strengths of the present study are the fact that
we used an established anxiety induction method, we in-
vestigated adaptive and pathological anxiety by examining
GAD patients and healthy controls, and we used a para-
digm that allowed us to parametrically modulate WM
load. By using a robust translational method of anxiety in-
duction like threat of shock that can be turned on and off
in the same experimental run, each subject served as his
or her own control. We were thus able to make inferences
about pathology, and more specifically about active path-
ology (i.e., when an anxiety patient is in an anxious state),
as well as adaptive anxiety. Further, the use of translational
research methods facilitates comparison between human
and animal research, thus providing an important infor-
mational bridge across domains.
Although a within-subject paradigm was used to de-
tect group differences, 1) we cannot, with absolute cer-
tainty, attribute differences to the presence or absence of
anxious pathology in isolation from potential comorbid
pathology 2) we cannot make conclusions about the ef-
fect of anxiety on other types of WM. However, given
that we induced an anxious state, it is much less likely
that our findings were the result of a manifestation of
pathology unrelated to anxiety. Additional research in
other WM domains (e.g., spatial) will need to be con-
ducted to make domain general and domain specific
conclusions regarding the impact of adaptive and mal-
adaptive anxiety on WM. Our work comparing spatial
and verbal WM performance during induced anxiety [2],
suggests that there may be group differences in spatial
WM performance as well. On the other hand, GAD ver-
bal WM may be more affected than spatial WM. A simi-
lar paradigm could be used in patients to address this
gap in the literature.
Conclusion
Our findings suggest that GAD patients have trouble sim-
ultaneously disengaging from threat and engaging in chal-
lenging WM processes, implicating that top-down control
processes prioritize anxiety reduction over task perform-
ance. Although the induction of anxiety in both patients
and healthy controls disrupts WM, only healthy controls
are able to abolish this disruption by engaging in a difficult
task. Instead of normalizing their WM performance under
threat, GAD patients continue to exhibit cognitive impair-
ment under high WM load. These findings indicate that,
unlike in adaptive anxiety, cognitive disruption in clinical
anxiety is robust and persistent. This effect should be
taken into consideration when cognitive strategies, like
CBT, are used as a therapeutic intervention. Explicit cog-
nitive strategies should be expanded to include attentional
control in addition to emotion regulation techniques to
optimize overall functioning.
Endnotes
1Here, we will use active to describe an anxious state
during an anxiogenic challenge. We prefer this term
over state anxiety because the latter conveys the idea
that this type of anxiety only differs in quantity, whereas
we intend to convey the idea that active anxiety may be
both qualitatively and quantitatively different in patients
than healthy controls. In other words, active anxiety in a
patient with GAD may include excessive rumination and
increased heart-rate variability, whereas active anxiety in
a healthy control may only manifest itself in increased
vigilance.
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